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Michael Lang1 
Limitation of Temporal Effects of CJEU Judgments –  
Mission Impossible for Governments of EU Member States2 
 
1. Meilicke and the CJEU Case Law on the Limitation of the Temporal effects of the 
CJEU 
In preliminary ruling cases the CJEU interprets the relevant provision of Union law. The 
domestic court referring the case to the CJEU has to decide whether a provision of its 
domestic law complies with or infringes Union law. However, the CJEU avoids deciding on 
the meaning of the domestic provision which is at stake in the case at hand. It just repeats the 
meaning of the domestic provision as explained by the domestic court and even avoids giving 
judgment on whether the concrete domestic provision infringes Union law. According to the 
concept of shared responsibilities between the CJEU and the domestic court, the CJEU 
regards itself as limited in its competence and to only be allowed to interpret Union law3. Of 
course, it gives its judgment in the light of a domestic provision as that had been described by 
the domestic court. However, the CJEU usually does not take a stand whether the description 
provided by the domestic court is the most convincing interpretation of the domestic rule or 
even accurate. Interpretation of domestic law is just not within the competence of the CJEU. 
The CJEU interprets Union law and, at least in its own perception, does not create Union law. 
The Court just explains the meaning of the law as it should always have been understood. 
Consequently, a judgment of the CJEU provides an interpretation that reaches back to the day 
when the Union law provision went into force. Thus, CJEU judgments usually have automatic 
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retroactive effect. At least in those domestic cases which are still open, domestic courts and 
authorities have to apply Union law as it has been interpreted by the Court, irrespective 
whether in previous case law any indication can be found which supports that interpretation, 
and even if a new interpretation provided by the CJEU seems to contradict earlier case law.  
However, the CJEU seems to be aware that this approach may have far-reaching 
consequences in some situations and may sometimes lead - at the very least - to confusion. As 
early as 1976, the CJEU decided for the first time to limit the temporal effects of one of its 
judgments.4 As there is no explicit legal basis at all in the EC Treaty for the CJEU to limit the 
temporal effects of one of its judgments under the rule which is today Art. 267 TFEU, the 
Court itself had to develop the criteria under which it is willing do so. The Court made it clear 
right from the beginning of this case law in 1976 that it was only willing to limit the effects of 
a judgment in exceptional cases. The criteria for limiting the temporal scope of a judgment, 
which will be further explained below, are in practice rarely applied. Usually the Court comes 
up with arguments why the criteria are not met in a specific case.  However, the Court seems 
to leave the door open in order to be able to limit the temporal scope of a judgment, in case its 
judgment would have unforeseen dramatic consequences for a Member State and it thus finds 
it necessary to take such an action. Thus, the Defrenne case law serves as an “emergency 
brake”.  
At first sight the Meilicke judgment seems to fit in this picture5. The Court found another 
reason why it did not have to limit the temporal scope of its judgment in this case. The CJEU 
did not want to get into the usual discussion as to whether there was any legal uncertainty or 
whether the judgment has severe economic repercussions, which is extremely difficult to 
measure in tax cases. The Court just mentioned that the German government had been too late 
to request a temporal limitation of the judgment. The appropriate case would have been one of 
its previous judgments. This seems to be an elegant way of avoiding discussing very technical 
questions.  
However, in the judgments to which the CJEU referred as the appropriate ones where such a 
request should have been made, cases referred by other Member States had been decided. 
Although the CJEU did not make a clear statement, its reasoning gives the impression that the 
                                                            
4 Case 43-75 Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 455. 
5 Case C-292/04, Meilicke [2007] ECR I-1872. 
temporal effects of a judgment have to be the same throughout the European Union6. If the 
temporal effects of a judgment are not limited, this is relevant in all Member States. 
Accordingly, if the CJEU limits the temporal effects of a judgment, this can only be done with 
effect for all Member States7: 
“35 It is only exceptionally that, in application of a general principle of legal certainty 
which is inherent in the Community legal order, the Court may decide to restrict the 
right to rely upon a provision, which it has interpreted, with a view to calling in 
question legal relations established in good faith (see, in particular, Case C-104/98 
Buchner and Others [2000] ECR I-3625, paragraph 39, and Linneweber and 
Akritidis, cited above, paragraph 42). 
36      In addition, as the Court has consistently held, such a restriction may be 
allowed only in the actual judgment ruling upon the interpretation sought (Case 
309/85 Barra [1988] ECR 355, paragraph 13; Case 24/86 Blaizot [1988] ECR 379, 
paragraph 28; Case C-163/90 Legros and Others [1992] ECR I-4625, paragraph 30; 
Case C-415/93 Bosman and Others [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 142; and Case C-
437/97 EKW and Wein & Co. [2000] ECR I-1157, paragraph 57).  
37      Indeed, there must necessarily be a single occasion when a decision is made on 
the temporal effects of the requested interpretation, which the Court gives of a 
provision of Community law. In that regard, the principle that a restriction may be 
allowed only in the actual judgment ruling upon that interpretation guarantees the 
equal treatment of the Member States and of other persons subject to Community law, 
under that law, fulfilling, at the same time, the requirements arising from the principle 
of legal certainty.” 
The Court emphasizes that “the equal treatment of the Member States and of other persons 
subject to Community law” has to be guaranteed. The equal treatment of Member States can 
also be guaranteed if all of them have the opportunity to request a limitation of the temporal 
effects of a certain judgment at the same time. This does not necessarily mean that such a 
limitation has effect for all Member States. However, an equal treatment of all “persons 
subject to Community law” makes it necessary that the temporal effects of a judgment are 
limited either throughout the European Union or not at all.     
                                                            
6 See in more detail M Lang, „Die Beschränkung der zeitlichen Wirkung von EuGH-Urteilen im Lichte des 
Urteils Meilicke“, (2007) 7 Internationales Steuerrecht, 237. 
7 Case C-292/04, Meilicke [2007] ECR I-1872, Para 35 et seq. 
Advocate General Stix-Hackl arrived in her Opinion at the opposite result8: “Furthermore, 
where a limitation on the temporal effects of a judgment is ordered, it only applies to the 
Member State to which it was granted. Thus, the territorial scope of exceptions to ex tunc 
effect is restricted.” In Banca di Cremona she explained her position in detail9: “However, 
any temporal limitation and any exception thereto decided upon by the Court will be based on 
an assessment of the situation — existence of good faith on the part of the State, risk of 
serious disruption for the State and need for effective judicial protection of diligent claimants 
— in Italy, and that assessment might be quite different with regard to another Member State 
which also applied a tax having the same characteristics. […] That consideration implies that 
any limitation should be not only temporal but also, in effect, spatial — a point of some 
relevance in the present case since it appears from several of the numerous articles which 
have already appeared in legal and tax journals concerning this case that one or more Member 
States other than Italy may apply taxes which, at least in the opinion of some authors, share 
certain characteristics with IRAP.” 
At first sight the recent Skoma-Lux decision seems to be on the territorial scope of judgments 
of the CJEU10. This case dealt with a Union law rule which was in effect already before the 
accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union and had never been translated and 
officially published by the EU in the Czech language11. The Court held that this rule cannot 
have any binding effect in the Czech Republic. From that perspective the territorial scope of 
the judgment was limited. The Court was also asked to limit the temporal effects of its 
judgment. However, the CJEU held that its Defrenne case law was not relevant in such a 
context12: “However, that case-law concerns a different situation from that before the Court. 
In fact, in the present case it is not a question of limiting the temporal effects of a judgment of 
the Court concerning the interpretation of a provision of Community law, but of limiting the 
temporal effects of a judgment which concerns the actual enforceability, in a Member State, 
of a Community act. Consequently, that case-law cannot be applied to the present case.” 
Therefore one cannot conclude from Skoma-Lux that the Court wanted to deviate from its 
decision in Meilicke.   
Though the CJEU does not seem to accept territorial limitations when it decides to limit the 
temporal scope of a judgment, the Court has never explicitly taken this view, either in 
                                                            
8 Case C-292/04, Meilicke [2007] ECR I-1872, Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl Para 14. 
9 Case C-475/03, Banca Popolare die Cremona [2006] ECR I-9373, Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, Para 181. 
10 Case C-161/06, Skoma-Lux [2007] ECR I-10869.  
11 Case C-161/06, Skoma-Lux [2007] ECR I-10869, Para. 17. 
12 Case C-161/06, Skoma-Lux [2007] ECR I-10869, Para. 68. 
Meilicke or in any other later judgment. However, under the assumption that no such 
territorial limitation can be made it seems to be interesting to examine how this fits into the 
existing case law and how the Court would apply its usual criteria to limit the temporal scope 
of a judgment. Therefore, I will describe the criteria used by the CJEU in more detail (section 
II)13 and then apply them in the framework just described (section III).      
        
2. The Existing Case Law on the Limitation of Temporal Effects of CJEU Judgments  
 
2.1. The Rule and the Exception 
The Court gives the following reasoning why its judgments in general have retroactive 
effects14: “It has consistently been held that the interpretation which the Court, in the exercise 
of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article 177 [now Article 269] of the Treaty, gives to a 
rule of Community law clarifies and where necessary defines the meaning and scope of that 
rule as it must be, or ought to have been, understood and applied from the time of its coming 
into force. It follows that the rule as thus interpreted can, and must, be applied by the courts 
even to legal relationships arising and established before the judgment ruling on the request 
for interpretation, provided that in other respects the conditions for bringing before the courts 
having jurisdiction an action relating to the application of that rule are satisfied [ …].” 
There is not much room for limiting the temporal effects of judgments of the CJEU15: “It is 
only exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general principle of legal 
                                                            
13 See already Lang (n 4) 235. 
14 Case 61/79, Denkavit Italiana [1980] ECR 1205, Para. 16; Case 66/79, Salumi [1980] ECR 1237, Para. 9; 
Case 24/86, Blaizot v Université de Liège [1988] ECR 379, Para. 27; Joined Cases C-367/93 to C-377/93, Roders 
and others [1995] ECR I-02229, Para. 42; Case C-415/93, Bosman [1995] ECR I-04921, Para. 141; Case C-
197/94, Société Bautiaa [1996] ECR I-00505, Para. 47; Case C-262/96, Sürül [1999] ECR I-2685, Para. 107; 
Case C-294/99, Athinaiki Zythopoiia AE [2001] ECR I-6797, Para. 35; Case C-347/00 Barreira Pérez [2002] 
ECR I-8191, Para. 44; Joined Cases C-453/02 and C-462/02 Linneweber und Akritidis [2005] ECR I-1131, Para. 
41; Case C-209/03, Dany Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119, Para. 66; Case C-290/05, Ákos Nádasdi [2006] ECR I-0000, 
Para. 62; Case C-313/05, Brzezinski [2007], ECR I-00513, Para. 55;  Case C-525/11, Mednis SIA, [2012], Para. 
41. 
15 Case 24/86, Blaizot v Université de Liège [1988] ECR 379, Para. 28; Case C-163/90, Legros and Others 
[1992] ECR I-4625, Para. 30; Case C-415/93, Bosman [1995] ECR I-04921, Para. 142; Case C-262/96, Sürül 
[1999] ECR I-2685, Para. 108; Case C-437/97, EKW and Wein & Co [2000] ECR I-1157, Para. 57; Case C-
347/00 Barreira Pérez [2002] ECR I-8191, Para. 45; Joined Cases C-453/02 and C-462/02 Linneweber und 
Akritidis [2005] ECR I-1131, Para. 42; Case C-228/05, Stradasfalti Srl [2006] ECR I-0000, Para. 72; Case C-
313/05, Brzezinski [2007], ECR I-00513, Para. 56; Case C-138/07, Cobelfret NV [2009], ECR I-00731, Para. 68; 
Case C-426/07, Krawczynski, ECR I-06021, Para. 42. Case C-2/09, Kalinchev [2010], ECR I-04939, Para. 50. 
certainty inherent in the Community legal order, be moved to restrict the opportunity for any 
person concerned to rely upon the provision as thus interpreted with a view to calling in 
question legal relationships established in good faith. Such a restriction may be allowed only 
by the Court, in the actual judgment ruling upon the interpretation sought […].” The Court 
emphasizes that the scope for such exceptions to the rule is very limited16: ”In determining 
whether or not to limit the temporal effect of a judgment it is necessary to bear in mind that 
although the practical consequences of any judicial decision must be weighed carefully, the 
Court cannot go so far as to diminish the objectivity of the law and compromise its future 
application on the ground of the possible repercussions which might result, as regards the 
past, from a judicial decision […].”    
Advocate General Stix-Hackl summarized the case law of the Court in the following way17: 
“Such a limitation may only be considered when there is a risk of serious economic 
repercussions owing in particular to the large number of legal relationships entered into in 
good faith on the basis of national rules considered to be validly in force. […] In addition it 
must be apparent that the individuals and the national authorities have been led into adopting 
practices which do not comply with Community legislation by reason of objective, significant 
uncertainty regarding the implications of Community provisions to which the conduct of other 
Member States or the Commission may even have contributed.”  
  
2.2. Good Faith and Legal Uncertainty 
The leading case on limitation of temporal effects of CJEU judgments is Defrenne18. In this 
judgment the Court already took the position that the Commission has contributed to the 
uncertainty19: “The fact that, in spite of the warnings given, the commission did not initiate 
proceedings under Article 169 against the Member States concerned on grounds of failure to 
fulfill an obligation was likely to consolidate the incorrect impression as to the effects of 
Article 119.” Even the fact the Commission did not initiate proceedings against the Member 
State could, in the Court’s view, establish good faith in the wrong interpretation of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Case C-263/11, Ainars Redlihs [2012], 19 July 2012, Para. 59.  Case C-525/11, Mednis SIA, [2012] 18 October 
2012, Para. 42. 
16 Case 24/86, Blaizot v Université de Liège [1988] ECR 379, Para. 30; Case C-163/90, Legros and Others 
[1992] ECR I-4625, Para. 30; Case C-437/97 EKW and Wein & Co [2000] ECR I-1157, Para. 57; Case C-
228/05, Stradasfalti Srl [2006] ECR I-0000, Para. 72. 
17 Case C-292/04, Meilicke [2007] ECR I-1872, Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, Para 38. 
18 Case 43-75, Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 455. 
19 Case 43-75, Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 455Para. 73. 
Community law provision at stake. Thus, one can infer from this judgment that it does not 
require much activity by the Commission to conclude that the Commission contributed to the 
uncertainty. However, there has to be at least some activity by the Commission: In Brouwer 
the CJEU held20: “[…] the fact that the Commission had not initiated any Treaty infringement 
proceedings in that regard against the Kingdom of Belgium cannot be interpreted as the 
Commission’s tacit consent to the wage discrimination that the Belgian authorities tolerated 
for the period from 1984 to 1994 in calculating the retirement pensions of female frontier 
workers.” 
However, there are other judgments in which the role of the Commission was more active: In 
Blaizot21 the Court held “that letters sent by the Commission to Belgium in 1984 show that at 
that time the Commission did not consider the imposition of the supplementary enrolment fee 
to be contrary to community law. It was not until 25 June 1985, in the course of an informal 
meeting with officials of the Belgian Education Ministries, that the Commission stated that it 
had changed its position. Two days later […] it stated during a meeting of the Education 
Committee established by the Council that it had not completed its review of the matter; that 
is to say, it had not yet formed a definite opinion […] The attitude thus adopted by the 
Commission might reasonably have led the Authorities concerned in Belgium to consider that 
the relevant Belgian legislation was in conformity with Community law.” Also, in EKW the 
Court noted “that the Commission's conduct may have caused the Austrian Government 
reasonably to believe that the legislation governing the duty on alcoholic beverages was in 
conformity with Community law.”22 For Advocate General Saggio there was not sufficient 
evidence to assume that the Commission had misled the Austrian government23: “The 
assertion that representatives of the Commission, in the course of negotiations for the 
accession of the Republic of Austria to the Community, stated to or gave it to be understood 
by the Austrian authorities that the duty at issue was lawful has not been confirmed by the 
Commission and it finds no echo in the documents before the Court.” However, for the CJEU 
it was sufficient that “the Austrian Government contended, without being challenged on this 
point, that Commission representatives had assured it, during the negotiations prior to the 
                                                            
20 Case C-577/08, Brouwer, [2010] ECR I-7489, Para 39. 
21 Case 24/86, Blaizot v Université de Liège [1988] ECR 379, Para. 32 et seq. 
22 Case C-437/97, EKW and Wein & Co [2000] ECR I-1157, Para. 58. 
23 Case C-437/97, EKW and Wein & Co [2000] ECR I-1157, Opinion of AG Saggio, Para 64. 
accession of the Republic of Austria to the European Union, that the beverage duty was 
compatible with Community law.”24 
In Stradasfalti the Italian government was, in the Court’s view, not misled25: “In the present 
case, although the Commission has supported the Italian authorities in respect of the years at 
issue in the main proceedings, it is nevertheless clear from the observations submitted to the 
Court that the VAT Committee has repeatedly pointed out to the Italian Government, since 
1980, that the derogation in question could not be justified on the basis of Article 17(7) of the 
Sixth Directive, and that the more conciliatory attitude adopted by that committee during its 
meetings of 1999 and 2000 was a result of the Italian authorities’ undertaking to re-examine 
the measure before 1 January 2001 and the possibilities presented at that time by the 
Commission’s proposal to amend the Sixth Directive as regards the right to VAT deduction. 
[…] Under those circumstances, the Italian authorities could not be unaware that the 
systematic renewal, since 1979, of a derogating measure which was supposed to be 
temporary and which could only be justified, under the very wording of Article 17(7) of the 
Sixth Directive, by ‘cyclical economic reasons’, was not compatible with that Article. […] 
The Italian authorities cannot therefore invoke the existence of legal relationships established 
in good faith in order to ask the Court to limit the temporal effects of its judgment.” 
In Legros one cannot deny that the Commission contributed to the legal uncertainty26: “As 
regards the present case, the particular characteristics of the dock dues and the specific 
identity of the French overseas departments have created a situation of uncertainty regarding 
the lawfulness of the charge at issue under Community law. That uncertainty is also reflected 
by the conduct of the Community institutions in relation to the problem of the dock dues. […] 
First, the Commission did not pursue the procedure for establishing a breach of obligations 
which had been initiated against France in relation to the dock dues. It then proposed to the 
Council Decision 89/688, which was intended, inter alia, to authorize maintenance of the 
dock dues on a temporary basis in the context of the aforementioned Poseidom programme. 
Finally, the third and fourth recitals of the preamble to that decision state that "the dock dues 
at present constitute a means of support for local production, which has to contend with the 
problems of remoteness and insularity" and that "they also are a vital instrument of self-
reliance and local democracy, the resources of which must constitute a means of economic 
and social development of the French overseas departments". [...] Those circumstances could 
                                                            
24 Case C-437/97, EKW and Wein & Co [2000] ECR I-1157, Para. 56. 
25 Case C-228/05, Stradasfalti Srl [2006] ECR I-0000, Para. 73-75. 
26 Case C-163/90, Legros and Others [1992] ECR I-4625, Paras. 31-33. 
have led the French Republic and the local authorities in the French overseas departments 
reasonably to consider that the applicable national legislation was in conformity with 
Community law.”  
In Societe Regie Networks, a tax case in the state aid area, it was a Commission decision, 
although contested, which contributed sufficiently to the uncertainty27: In “particular, the fact 
that the aid scheme at issue was notified to the Commission and the decision by which the 
latter authorised that scheme was not challenged before the Community judicature are 
capable of justifying the imposition of a limitation on the temporal effects of the declaration 
that the contested decision is invalid.” 
Nevertheless, Commission and Member States can only contribute to the legal uncertainty. 
The CJEU requires the Member State that is asking for the limitation of the temporal effects 
to put forward arguments why the legal situation had to be considered uncertain. Yet, it is 
enough that “this is the first time that the Court has been called on to interpret” the provision 
at stake28. The Court consistently rejects the assumption of uncertainty if there is already well-
established case law on a certain provision of Community law29. However, it is also possible 
that if the case law of the Court itself gives the impression of being contradictory it creates 
uncertainty30. The CJEU’s decision in Bosman may serve as an example that the explanation 
why the legal-uncertainty test is met may be rather short31: “In the present case, the specific 
features of the rules laid down by the sporting associations for transfers of players between 
clubs of different Member States, together with the fact that the same or similar rules applied 
to transfers both between clubs belonging to the same national association and between clubs 
belonging to different national associations within the same Member State, may have caused 
uncertainty as to whether those rules were compatible with Community law.” The threshold 
for legal uncertainty is therefore not very high.   
 
                                                            
27 Case C-333/07, Société Régie Networks [2008] ECR I-10807, Para 123. 
28 Case 24/86, Blaizot v Université de Liège [1988] ECR 379, Para. 29; Case C-262/96, Sürül [1999] ECR I-
2685, Para. 109; Case C-437/97, EKW and Wein & Co [2000] ECR I-1157, Para. 58. 
29 Case 61/79, Denkavit Italiana [1980] ECR 1205, Para. 21; Case C-57/93, Vroege [1994] ECR I-04541, Paras. 
28-30; Joined Cases C-367/93 to C-377/93, Roders and others [1995] ECR I-02229, Para. 45; Case C-415/93, 
Bosman [1995] ECR I-04921, Para. 146; Case C-104/98, Johann Buchner [2000] ECR I-3625, Para. 40. 
30 Case C-262/96, Sürül [1999] ECR I-2685, Para. 110. 
31 Case C-415/93, Bosman [1995] ECR I-04921, Para. 143. 
2.3. Serious Economic Repercussions 
From Defrenne one can already infer that a risk of serious economic percussions has to exist 
if the Court is to limit the temporal effects of its judgment32: “In view of the large number of 
people concerned such claims, which undertakings could not have foreseen, might seriously 
affect the financial situation of such undertakings and even drive some of them to 
bankruptcy.” However, the Court did not mention how it arrived at these conclusions. Thus, it 
left open what the real threshold is in order to assume that the financial situation of 
undertakings is “seriously” affected. 
While in Defrenne private undertakings had to suffer serious economic difficulties, in other 
cases the governments, although at different levels, were the victims. However, in those 
judgments the Court did not give a more detailed reasoning either: In EKW the Court just 
stated that not limiting the temporal effects of the judgment “would retroactively cast into 
confusion the system whereby Austrian municipalities are financed.”33 In Legros the CJEU 
held that “overriding considerations of legal certainty preclude legal relationships whose 
effects have been exhausted in the past from being called into question when this would 
retroactively upset the system for financing the local authorities of the French overseas 
departments.” 34 Similarily, the Court in Sürül took the position that “any reopening of the 
question of legal relationships which have been definitively determined before the delivery of 
this judgment […] would retroactively throw the financing of the social security systems of 
the Member States into confusion.” 35 In Blaizot the CJEU used a similar terminology, again 
without examining the situation in detail36: “In those circumstances, pressing considerations 
of legal certainty preclude any reopening of the question of past legal relationships where 
that would retroactively throw the financing of university education into confusion and might 
have unforeseeable consequences for the proper functioning of universities.” A very brief 
reasoning can be found in Société Régie Networks where the CJEU granted a limitation of the 
temporal effects of its judgment37: “In this instance, it is clear, […], that the aid scheme in 
question was applicable for a period of five years and that a great deal of aid was paid under 
that scheme, affecting a large number of operators.” The CJEU’s judgment in Bosman can 
serve as an example that there are even cases in which the Court does not explicitly examine 
                                                            
32 Case 43-75, Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 455Para. 70. 
33 Case C-437/97, EKW and Wein & Co [2000] ECR I-1157, Para. 59. 
34 Case C-163/90, Legros and Others [1992] ECR I-4625, Para. 34. 
35 Case C-262/96, Sürül [1999] ECR I-2685, Para. 111. 
36 Case 24/86, Blaizot v Université de Liège [1988] ECR 379, Para. 34. 
37 Case C-333/07, Société Régie Networks [2008] ECR I-10807, Para 123. 
the issue of possible economic consequences at all38. All these judgments have in common 
that the Court finally limited the temporal effects of its judgment. 
In other judgments the CJEU arrived at different results: In Société Bautiaa the Court did not 
accept “the argument that the French Government would suffer significant financial loss […]. 
The financial consequences which might ensue for a government owing to the unlawfulness of 
a tax or imposition have never in themselves justified limiting the effects of a judgment of the 
Court […]. Furthermore, to limit the effects of a judgment solely on the basis of such 
considerations would considerably diminish the judicial protection of the rights which 
taxpayers have under Community fiscal legislation […].” Since “the French Government has 
not shown that, at the time when the registration duty at issue was levied, Community law 
could reasonably be understood as authorizing the maintenance of that duty”, the Court was 
not willing to limit the temporal effects of its judgments.39 The fact that this judgment was the 
first time the CJEU had been called on to interpret this Community provision was not 
sufficient for assuming legal uncertainty. In Athinaiki Zythopoiia the Court rejected the 
request of the Greek government to limit the temporal effects of the CJEU’s judgment on the 
interpretation of a provision of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive for identical reasons.40 
The Court has made it clear that it does not assume it has an obligation to examine ex officio 
how severe the economic consequences of its judgments are. On the contrary, the burden of 
proof is completely with the governments of the Member States: In Bidar the Court held that 
in “the present case, it suffices to state that the information provided by the United Kingdom, 
German and Austrian Governments is not capable of supporting their argument that this 
judgment might, if its effects were not limited in time, entail significant financial 
consequences for the Member States. The figures referred to by those governments in fact 
relate also to cases which are not similar to that at issue in the main proceedings.”41 Thus, it 
was decisive that the governments did not provide the Court with the figures which were 
relevant in the Court’s view, and the Court, moreover, did not find it necessary to ask the 
governments to come up with figures that relate to the cases which were relevant in the 
Court’s opinion. In Stradasfalti the CJEU reasoned that “the Italian Government has not been 
able to demonstrate the soundness of the calculation which led it to argue before the Court 
that the present judgment might, if its temporal effects were not limited, entail significant 
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financial consequences”42. Similarly, the CJEU decided in Brzezinski against the limitation of 
the temporal effects of its judgment43: “Regarding the risk of serious difficulties, at the 
hearing the Polish Government produced figures relating to the period from 1 May 2004, the 
date on which the Republic of Poland acceded to the European Union, and 30 April 2006, 
thus a two-year period, and showing that the total excise duties levied on passenger cars 
amounted to 1.16% of the budget revenues forecasted for 2006. However, the Court has not 
been provided with a breakdown of those figures, which would have afforded the opportunity 
to assess what proportion of that total would give rise to reimbursement. Moreover, only the 
excise duty amounts exceeding those corresponding to the residual duty included in similar 
second-hand vehicles originating from the Member State concerned must be reimbursed.” 
The CJEU’s reasoning in Kalinchev is similar44: “At the hearing, the Bulgarian Government 
produced figures relating to the amount presumed owing following a possible unfavourable 
judgment by the Court. However, the Court has not been provided with a breakdown of those 
figures, which would have afforded the opportunity to assess what proportion of that total 
would give rise to reimbursement. […] Consequently, the Court finds that the risk of serious 
economic difficulties, as contemplated in the case-law referred to in paragraphs 50 to 52 of 
this judgment, such as to justify placing a temporal limitation on the effects of this judgment, 
has not been established.” In Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation the Court took the 
position that “it is sufficient to hold […] the United Kingdom Government has put forward an 
amount which includes the actions brought by the claimants in the main proceedings and 
which form the subject-matter of each of the questions referred for preliminary ruling, 
thereby proceeding on the, incorrect, assumption that the Court would answer each of the 
questions in the manner proposed by the claimants in the main proceedings. […] In those 
circumstances, it is not necessary to limit the temporal effects of this judgment.”45 This 
reasoning indicates that the Court might have considered limiting the temporal effects if the 
government had provided the Court with alternative calculations, taking into account that the 
Court may hold on some questions in the manner proposed by the claimants, and on others 
differently. 
Making such calculations has become very difficult for another reason as well: At least in the 
area of the freedoms the Court has accepted more justifications than previously, which has 
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forced it to examine proportionality more closely too46. Therefore, more and more often the 
CJEU neither merely declares a certain rule to comply with or to infringe Union law but 
develops criteria under which such a rule may be acceptable. A famous but in no way extreme 
example is Marks & Spencer47: “Accordingly, the answer to the first question must be that, as 
Community law now stands, Articles 43 EC and 48 EC do not preclude provisions of a 
Member State which generally prevent a resident parent company from deducting from its 
taxable profits losses incurred in another Member State by a subsidiary established in that 
Member State although they allow it to deduct losses incurred by a resident subsidiary. 
However, it is contrary to Articles 43 EC and 48 EC to prevent the resident parent company 
from doing so where the non-resident subsidiary has exhausted the possibilities available in 
its State of residence of having the losses taken into account for the accounting period 
concerned by the claim for relief and also for previous accounting periods and where there 
are no possibilities for those losses to be taken into account in its State of residence for future 
periods either by the subsidiary itself or by a third party, in particular where the subsidiary 
has been sold to that third party.” More than seven years later it is still unclear what the Court 
really had in mind when requiring the deduction of final losses, and recently it has even been 
suggested that the CJEU should completely reconsider that line of case law48. At the time 
when the Marks & Spencer decision was rendered its content was considered a surprise by 
most observers and rarely did anybody predict the requirements which were developed by the 
Court in its judgment. Therefore, it is questionable to require from a government, which 
requests to limit the temporal effects of the judgment, not only to foresee what exactly the 
Court will decide but to come up with detailed calculations for this and any other scenario 
which the CJEU might otherwise develop. At least in theory there are uncountable possible 
scenarios.         
If possible, the Court avoids referring to concrete figures. One exception is the judgment in 
Akos Nadasdi49: “The Hungarian Government estimated the total amount of revenue from 
registration duty charged on those vehicles to be around 116 million euros. It acknowledged 
that not all of that amount would have to be reimbursed, but only the part corresponding to 
the excess duty charged on those vehicles in light of their depreciation. […] The amount to be 
reimbursed is not so high that the reimbursement, as such, is likely to have serious economic 
repercussions of such a kind to justify a limitation of the temporal effect of this judgment.” In 
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Meilicke Advocate General Stix-Hackl emphasized that the sum of 5 billion ”relates to the 
potential scale of the financial risks if all of the taxpayers affected by the credit procedure 
were to lodge appeals”50. In her Opinion in Banca populare di Cremona she accepted that the 
“amount of tax which may be claimed back has been stated by the Italian Government to be 
some EUR 120 billion”, since “the figure has not been contested”51.  
The latter statement seems to indicate that the burden of proof could be shifted to other 
parties represented in the case. So, if a certain amount of revenue losses stated by a 
government has not been contested by any other party in a certain case, one could continue to 
work with the assumption that the economic repercussions are as severe as described by the 
government. However, this leads to the question who the other parties are and what their 
interests and capacities are. The other governments tend to be loyal to the governments 
whose revenue might be at stake, for the simple reason that there will be other cases where 
the roles are reversed and they will depend on the support of the other Member States. The 
Commission, as the watchdog of Union law, is in a neutral and objective position, but does 
not have any power to look into the tax files of the taxpayers who might have a claim to a 
reimbursement of their tax and thus cannot assess the estimate provided by the government. 
The taxpayer whose case was the reason for the preliminary ruling does not have any 
possibility to make this assessment either. For reasons of tax secrecy his government will not 
permit him to look into other taxpayers’ files. Even more important, he does not have any 
motivation to contest such an estimate provided by a government: He is not all affected by a 
possible limitation of the temporal effects of a judgment, since the CJEU, if it is to their 
benefit, usually excludes from the limitation of the temporal effects of the judgment those 
taxpayers who had initiated the domestic court procedure that led to the judgment52. So in 
case the CJEU takes the estimate provided by the government for granted, unless contested, 
there is a structural problem, since no other party is either willing or able to come up with 
other serious calculations. Therefore, on the one hand, it makes sense to require the 
government to provide real evidence. On the other hand, for governments this is, for the 
reasons mentioned above, an almost impossible task. 
              
                                                            
50 Case C-292/04, Meilicke [2007] ECR I-1872, Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, Para 63. 
51 Case C-475/03, Banca popolare di Cremona, [2006] ECR I-9373, Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, Para 156. 
52 Case C-163/90, Legros and Others [1992] ECR I-4625, Paras. 35 et seq. 
3. Limitation of Temporal Effects: Applicable in all Member States? 
 
3.1. The Relevant Judgment 
The deliberations above have already shown that applying the criteria the CJEU has 
developed in order to decide on the limitation of the temporal effects of its judgments is not 
an easy task. The burden on governments to provide the necessary evidence is high. In 
Meilicke the Court made it clear that such a request can only be dealt with in the judgment in 
which the CJEU decides a legal question for the first time and if governments miss this 
opportunity the Court is prevented from granting such a limitation of the temporal effects of 
its case law in a later judgment53. Therefore, governments have to make a lot of effort to make 
this request the appropriate case. Moreover, in Meilicke the CJEU gave the impression that 
the temporal effects of a judgment cannot be limited for a single Member State alone but only 
for the whole European Union. If the Court maintains this position even those governments 
which are not immediately involved in a case, because the request for a preliminary ruling 
came from a court of another Member State, could be forced to ask for a limitation of the 
temporal effects of a judgment, in order not to miss the right point in time. Therefore, 
determining the case in which a certain interpretation of the relevant European law provision 
will be rendered for the first time might be crucial.    
In Meilicke the Court explained that the relevant judgment had already been Verkooijen54: 
“The interpretation sought by the present reference for a preliminary ruling concerns the tax 
treatment which a Member State must, within the framework of a national system designed to 
prevent or lessen double taxation, accord to dividends distributed by a company established 
in another Member State. In that regard, it is clear from Verkooijen that Community law 
precludes a legislative provision of a Member State, which makes the grant of exemption from 
income tax payable on dividends paid to natural persons who are shareholders subject to the 
condition that those dividends are paid by a company whose seat is in that Member State 
(paragraph 62).” The Court added55: “In addition, the principles adopted in Verkooijen, 
which thus clarified the requirements arising from the principle of free movement of capital in 
respect of dividends received by residents from non-resident companies, were confirmed by 
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the judgments in Case C-315/02 Lenz [2004] ECR I-7063 and in Manninen (see Test 
Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, paragraph 215).” 
It is obvious that the legal questions referred to the CJEU usually differ from case to case. 
Even if the European law provision which is at stake is identical, the domestic legal 
framework of the case differs. Although the CJEU has no competence to interpret domestic 
law, it has to interpret Union law in the light of the case at hand and therefore indirectly in the 
light of the domestic provisions which cause the potential infringement. At least in respect of 
technical details such domestic provisions differ from Member State to Member State. 
Sometimes the details of a domestic provision are not very different but they are embedded in 
another legal context. Therefore, it is almost never the case that the CJEU has to decide on a 
legal question which is completely identical to the question it had to deal with in a previous 
case. Therefore, determining the “actual judgment ruling upon the interpretation sought” 
depends on the level of abstraction.  
Meilicke and Verkooijen have in common that both cases had been on dividends paid by a 
foreign corporation to a domestic shareholder. In both cases the taxpayers were individuals 
and the cases therefore dealt with individual income taxation. This is also true for Lenz and 
Manninen. These cases had been decided by the Court after Verkooijen and the CJEU referred 
to them in Meilicke as well. From this one could conclude that Verkooijen was the relevant 
judgment for all cases of discriminatory treatment of dividends paid by entities resident in 
other EU Member States to domestic individual shareholders. Whenever any other such case 
is referred to the CJEU, the Court is prevented from limiting the temporal effects of its 
judgment. 
However, the statements made by the CJEU in Meilicke could be understood as even going 
beyond this: The Court cited Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation as well. That case 
dealt with domestic corporations to which foreign dividends were paid. Not individual 
income tax but corporate income tax was at stake. So one could go one step further and 
conclude that governments will never be granted any limitation of temporal effects of a 
judgment in cases of discriminatory treatment of dividends, irrespective whether in the area of 
individual or corporate income tax. 
This leads to the question why Verkooijen should not be seen as the relevant judgment for 
other taxes as well. One could assume that it should not make a difference whether foreign 
shares are discriminated against in the area of individual or corporate income tax, on the one 
hand, or for property or net wealth tax purposes, on the other hand. However, it must not be 
overlooked that the Court in Meilicke had not referred to Baars which had been decided 
already before Verkooijen and where the Court had to decide on the interpretation of the 
freedoms in light of the Netherlands wealth tax56. In Baars foreign shares were treated 
discriminatorily57. Since the CJEU did not mention its Baars judgment in Meilicke one can 
assume that the Court distinguishes between income taxes and other taxes58.  
There is another difference between Verkooijen and Baars: Verkooijen was on the 
interpretation of the free movement on capital, whereas in Baars the CJEU had to decide on 
the interpretation of the freedom of establishment. However, at least in intra-Union situations 
the standard applied by the CJEU to both freedoms is identical. It would therefore be 
surprising if the applicable freedom really matters. Since the Court accepted Verkooijen as the 
appropriate judgment where it should have been asked to decide on the limitation of the 
temporal effects of its judgment on the discriminatory treatment of foreign shares, it could 
have gone one step further and already considered Baars as its relevant judgment for these 
cases59.  
However, Meilicke and Manninen have in common that both cases deal with imputation 
systems60. Both in Meilicke and Manninen the Court has looked at tax systems of two 
different Member States in order to avoid discriminatory treatment in the residence state. In 
Baars, Verkooijen and Lenz the Court did not consider it relevant what the tax burden in the 
other Member State is. Therefore, many experts had expected that the CJEU would require in 
Manninen that foreign dividends have to be completely exempt, since this may be the factual 
effect in internal situations in Finland when a 19 % corporate income tax can be credited 
against a 19 % individual income tax. It came as a surprise to many observers that the Court 
finally held that the residence state may in such a situation continue to levy income taxes on 
foreign dividends and is merely obliged to grant a credit for the foreign tax61. Since in 
Manninen the Swedish corporate income tax was lower than the corporate income tax in 
Finland, there was a remaining individual income tax burden in Finland. In Meilicke this 
outcome had already been expected. Therefore, observers paid much more attention to the 
temporal effects of this judgment than to the substantive issue. From that perspective it would 
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have been much more convincing to consider Manninen to be the relevant judgment where 
the governments should have requested a limitation of the temporal effects62.  
This illustrates that it is extremely difficult for governments to guess which case is the 
appropriate one to request a limitation for the temporal effects. Only one judgment is the 
correct one, and they may learn later from the CJEU that they have already missed their 
opportunity. In Meilicke the Court took the view that Verkooijen would have been the 
appropriate case. The deliberations above demonstrate that the Court also had good reasons to 
consider Baars or Manninen the appropriate judgment. However, unlike Meilicke none of 
these cases was a German case. Therefore, governments have to observe all cases very 
carefully, and not only the ones stemming from their own countries, in order not to miss their 
opportunity.       
 
3.2. Good Faith and Legal Uncertainty 
 
Meilicke could also have the implication that the temporal effects of a judgment have to be the 
same throughout the European Union63. If the Court limits the temporal effects of a judgment, 
this can then only be done for all Member States. This might have further implications for the 
application of the criteria under which the Court is willing to accede to a government’s 
request.      
The CJEU requires the Member State that is asking for the limitation of the temporal effects 
to put forward arguments why the legal situation had to be considered uncertain. The criterion 
of uncertainty is an objective one and it does not seem to depend on the situation in one 
specific Member State. The CJEU held that such an uncertainty could arise if it “is the first 
time that the Court has been called on to interpret” the provision at stake64. The Court 
consistently rejects the assumption of uncertainty if there is already well-established case law 
                                                            
62 Lang (n 4) 241. 
63 See in more detail Lang (n 4) 237. 
64 Case 24/86, Blaizot v Université de Liège [1988] ECR 379, Para. 29; Case C-262/96, Sürül [1999] ECR I-
2685, Para. 109; Case C-437/97, EKW and Wein & Co [2000] ECR I-1157, Para. 58. 
on a certain provision of Union law65. It is also possible that if the case law of the Court itself 
gives the impression of being contradictory it creates uncertainty66.  
However, the above-cited CJEU decision in Bosman may serve as an example that the 
application of the legal-uncertainty test may be closely related to the legal situation in one 
Member State67: “In the present case, the specific features of the rules laid down by the 
sporting associations for transfers of players between clubs of different Member States, 
together with the fact that the same or similar rules applied to transfers both between clubs 
belonging to the same national association and between clubs belonging to different national 
associations within the same Member State, may have caused uncertainty as to whether those 
rules were compatible with Community law.” This can be explained by the fact that the CJEU 
gives guidance on the interpretation of Union law in the light of the facts of the case and 
therefore the domestic legal situation in one Member State may indirectly come into play. 
Therefore, the CJEU can limit the temporal effects of one of its judgments if the previous 
interpretation of the Union law provision at stake was not uncertain in general but only in the 
light of the domestic situation in one single Member State. This Member State is not 
necessarily the state from which the case stems but can be any other Member State. If the 
government of one state can convince the CJEU that in the light of its domestic law situation 
the interpretation of the relevant Union law provision was previously sufficiently uncertain, 
this might, if the other criteria are met as well, lead to the limitation of the temporal effects of 
that judgment throughout the whole Union. 
In addition, the Court requires that the Commission has contributed to this uncertainty. 
Sometimes, but not always, inactivity of the Commission is sufficient68: “The fact that, in 
spite of the warnings given, the Commission did not initiate proceedings under Article 169 
against the Member States concerned on grounds of failure to fulfill an obligation was likely 
to consolidate the incorrect impression as to the effects of Article 119.” Even the fact the 
Commission did not initiate proceedings against the Member State could, in the Court’s view, 
establish good faith in the wrong interpretation of the Community law provision at stake. The 
Court occasionally holds that the Commission has contributed to the uncertainty by tolerating 
a certain domestic treatment which later had been held to infringe Union law by the Court and 
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thus give the impression that the applicable Union law provision could be understood 
differently than later decided by the Court. Again, this could mean that governments have to 
monitor the domestic legal situation throughout the Union if they want to convince the Court 
that there was uncertainty. The fact that the Commission tolerated a certain Maltese provision 
for some time could serve as an argument for the Finnish government to explain to the Court 
that the interpretation of the Union law provision was uncertain before the CJEU judgment, 
and the Finnish government could raise such argument in an Irish case in which it asks for the 
limitation of the temporal effects of the expected judgment in the Irish case.    
More often, the Court requires that the Commission has taken at least some action which 
contributed to the uncertainty. The above-mentioned Blaizot case illustrates that good faith is 
often established by means of communication between the Commission and a specific 
Member State.69 The Commission might contribute to uncertainty by communicating with a 
specific Member State in writing or even orally. It is extremely difficult for other Member 
States to find out about an exchange of letters or a discussion going on between one Member 
State and the Commission. If they are aware of the fact that the Commission has contributed 
to the uncertainty in respect of one Member State they can raise that argument. However, 
often they will find out only by mere coincidence, even if they try to closely monitor how the 
Commission is dealing with other Member States. 
An extreme example already mentioned is EKW: In EKW the Court noted “that the 
Commission's conduct may have caused the Austrian Government reasonably to believe that 
the legislation governing the duty on alcoholic beverages was in conformity with Community 
law.” 70 For Advocate General Saggio there was not sufficient evidence to assume that the 
Commission had misled the Austrian government71: “The assertion that representatives of the 
Commission, in the course of negotiations for the accession of the Republic of Austria to the 
Community, stated to or gave it to be understood by the Austrian authorities that the duty at 
issue was lawful has not been confirmed by the Commission and it finds no echo in the 
documents before the Court.” However, for the CJEU it was sufficient that “the Austrian 
Government contended, without being challenged on this point, that Commission 
representatives had assured it, during the negotiations prior to the accession of the Republic 
of Austria to the European Union, that the beverage duty was compatible with Community 
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law.”72 For other Member States it would have been impossible to find out about this very 
informal communication which took place between the Commission and the Austrian 
government even before Austria joined the Union. However, if another Member State knew 
about it, and if the Austrian government itself had not successfully made this point, this 
information could have supported the claim to limit the temporal limitation of EKW. 
   
3.3. Serious Economic Repercussions 
The second relevant criterion for a limitation of the temporal effects of a judgment is that 
otherwise there would be “serious economic repercussions”. In tax cases one of the most 
relevant questions in this respect is the budgetary implications. It has already been noted how 
difficult it is to measure these and that it is almost impossible for the governments to come up 
with appropriate evidence. 
However, the budgetary impact of similar rules in different Member States may be very 
different. If we take the tax rules on foreign dividends as examples, as they had been part of 
the domestic tax systems in Verkooijen, Lenz, Manninen and Test Claimants in the FII Group 
Litigation, we easily realize that the budgetary implications of such judgments depend on the 
amount of the foreign investment, the domestic individual income tax rate, the budgetary 
relevance of income taxation compared to indirect taxes, and many other factors. Procedural 
rules could be extremely relevant since they may determine how many cases are still open and 
have to be decided in the light of a new judgment, if the Court does not limit its temporal 
effects. Countries whose tax system is built on just a few pillars might more severely suffer 
from an unexpected loss in revenues in respect of a certain tax than other countries. 
EKW illustrates that it might matter at which governmental level a tax is levied: The Austrian 
beverage tax which was at stake in that Austrian case was levied on a municipal level. This is 
why the Court stated in EKW that not limiting the temporal effects of the judgment “would 
retroactively cast into confusion the system whereby Austrian municipalities are financed.” 
For Austrian municipalities EKW would have otherwise had severe economic repercussions. 
However, if the same beverage tax had been levied on the central level, the economic 
repercussions for Austria in general would have been much less severe. Most likely the Court 
would not have considered limiting the temporal effects then. If the temporal effects of a 
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judgment have to be the same throughout the whole Union, the limitation of these effects 
might depend whether a certain tax is levied in a single Member state on a local level. 
Municipalities and provinces usually levy fewer different types of taxes. If these local 
governments have to pay back revenues in respect of one of these taxes the economic 
repercussions are often much more severe compared to a tax levied by the central 
government. If another Member State had a similar Union law problem as Austria had with its 
beverage taxes and if that Member State had already asked for a limitation of the temporal 
effects of the judgment, it would have benefitted from the fact that the Austrian beverage tax 
is levied at a local level. One might question whether such a result is satisfactory. 
Let us assume that for whatever reason the Austrian government would not have requested a 
limitation of the temporal effects of EKW and that such a limitation would have been in the 
interest of other Member States: For other Member States it would not have been possible to 
provide any evidence how severe the economic repercussions would have been for the 
Austrian municipalities. They would not have any access to the relevant information including 
taxpayers’ files in order to come up with any serious calculations. So if the Austrian central 
government, i.e. for reasons of internal politics, had not supported the Austrian municipalities 
and had just watched which repercussions they would suffer in order to increase their 
dependency on the central government, the governments of all the other EU Member States 
with similar beverage tax provisions would not have the slightest chance to get a limitation of 
the temporal effects of such a judgment.                     
The severity of the economic repercussions might also depend on the number of legal 
relationships concerned. This has already been illustrated in Defrenne, which is the leading 
case in this area73: “In view of the large number of people concerned by such claims, which 
undertakings could not have foreseen, might seriously affect the financial situation of such 
undertakings and even drive some of them to bankruptcy.” Although in the tax area the 
possible loss of revenue will be more relevant, administrative difficulties due to the large 
number of taxpayers could come into play as well. Again, the limitation of the temporal 
effects might then depend on the legal situation in a single Member State: If a beverage tax 
like the one at stake in EKW has to be paid back to each single consumer, this could also be 
taken in consideration. So if all but one Member State collects such a tax only from the 
producer of beverages, whereas one State applies a system where a large number of taxpayers 
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are concerned, the other Member States could benefit from the economic repercussions raised 
by that system, if they ask for a limitation of the temporal effects of the CJEU judgment. 
 
4. Conclusions  
The general approach of the CJEU in respect of the temporal effects of its judgments is 
understandable from a policy point of view: The Court wants to make sure that its judgments 
have retroactive effect as a matter of principle. Otherwise, Member States would not take the 
Court seriously, in particular not in tax cases. They will only observe Union law requirements 
if they have to fear that they might otherwise suffer severe economic consequences and that 
they might be forced to pay back a considerable amount of their tax revenues. However, at the 
same time it is understandable that the CJEU wants to leave the door open in order to limit 
these effects, if necessary. A retroactive application of its case law could in exceptional cases 
lead to an undesirable financial disaster for one or more Member States. The CJEU sees a 
need for an “emergency brake”. However, it is questionable whether the criteria developed by 
the Court in order to maintain this possibility really fit. Since the Court regards a limitation of 
the temporal effects of its judgment to be a rare exceptional situation, the standards to meet 
the criteria for such a limitation are extremely high. It is almost impossible for governments to 
meet them. Governments could consider it almost cynical if they are asked to provide 
evidence which often is almost impossible to provide. Meilicke has further complicated the 
rules of the game for the Member States: They have to request this limitation in the 
appropriate case. Appropriateness depends on the level of abstraction and it is impossible for 
the governments to foresee which case the CJEU will retrospectively consider to be the 
relevant one. In order not to miss any opportunity they have to come up with self-accusation 
as early as possible: A government will only be successful with its request for a limitation of 
the temporal effects in a case stemming from another Member State if it can convince the 
Court that its own tax system infringes Union law and that a judgment will lead to serious 
economic repercussions for its country. It goes without saying that the position of such a 
government will be rather weak when they have to defend the same tax rule in a later case and 
argue that the relevant Union law provision is not applicable to it. If the CJEU in Meilicke has 
really developed its case law further in the direction that temporal effects of judgment can be 
limited only for all or for no Member State, requesting a limitation of these effects becomes 
even more challenging for governments and the consequences arbitrary. The legal situation in 
a single Member State might be decisive as to whether the CJEU may grant the limitation of 
temporal effects to all the others. For all these reasons the Court would be well advised, on the 
one hand, to maintain its case law according to which only in exceptional cases judgments do 
not have retroactive effect and, on the other hand, to develop more transparent and operational 
criteria under which it is willing to distinguish between the rule and the exception. 
                    
